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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper investigates the welfare eﬀects of long-run inﬂation in economies with search and
nominal frictions. We disentangle diﬀerent ineﬃciencies associated with inﬂa t i o nb yc o n s i d e r i n g
two types of economies: Economies where there is no transaction demand for money balances,
called cashless economies, and monetary economies where there is a role for monetary exchange.1
First, we determine a condition under which price stability is optimal in cashless economies
and a condition under which positive inﬂation is desirable. We can relate these conditions to a
standard eﬃciency condition for search economies derived by Hosios (1990). Second, we show
that the result according to which the optimal inﬂation rate is nonnegative no longer holds
when one introduces monetary exchange. For all our numerical examples, the optimal inﬂation
rate is negative for monetary economies. We also establish that whether the Friedman rule is
(sub)optimal or not depends on the extent of search externalities. Finally, from a methodological
perspective, our paper is a step towards introducing nominal rigidities, which many view as
important for the study of monetary policy, into a search-theoretic model that treats money in
an internally consistent way.2
Building on the literature pioneered by Kiyotaki and Wright (1991, 1993) and extended
by Lagos and Wright (2005), we adopt a model where agents trade in bilateral meetings and
where means of payment are needed to mitigate a double-coincidence-of-wants problem. We
also endogenize the frequency of trades through a free-entry condition so that inﬂation aﬀects
both the quantities traded in individual matches (i.e., the intensive margin) and the number
of matches (i.e., the extensive margin). The introduction of nominal rigidities is based on the
model of Sheshinki and Weiss (1977). Sellers who incur a ﬁxed cost to change their prices adjust
prices only infrequently by following an endogenous (S,s) rule.3
1The term "cashless economy" has been inspired by the terminology of Woodford (2003). He considers an
economy in which no monetary assets are needed to facilitate transactions.
2For recent empirical evidence suggesting that price adjustments are infrequent, see Levy, Bergen, Dutta,
and Venable (1997) and Bils and Klenow (2004).
3The macroeconomic literature on state-dependent price adjustments was pioneered by Caplin and Spulber
(1987) and Caplin and Leahy (1991), and in search-theoretic environments, by Benabou (1988, 1992), Diamond
(1993), and Diamond and Felli (1992). Recent contributions include Dotsey, King, and Wolman (1999) and
2The result according to which positive long-run inﬂation can be socially desirable in cashless
economies with search frictions was ﬁrst pointed out through numerical examples by Benabou
(1992) and Diamond (1993). One of our contributions is to derive a condition under which price
stability is optimal in a tractable framework that generalizes Diamond (1993) by introducing
an intensive margin and giving buyers some market power. This condition states that inﬂation
(or deﬂation) can be good for society when sellers have too much market power, or equivalently,
when the congestion externality in the goods market is too severe. In the presence of sticky
prices, a deviation from price stability mitigates this ineﬃciency by reducing sellers’ incentives
to enter the market. Also, while many papers restrict themselves to non-negative inﬂation rates,
we allow for deﬂation and show that the optimal inﬂation rate is always non-negative.
The introduction of a transaction role for money into the previous environment brings two
additional insights. First, the result obtained in cashless economies according to which the
optimal inﬂation is non-negative is not robust to the introduction of an inﬂation tax. In the
absence of menu costs, the Friedman rule is optimal, and in the presence of menu costs, the
optimal inﬂation rate is negative. Second, the presence of nominal rigidities matters for the
(sub)optimality of the Friedman rule. Depending on the extent of the search externalities, it is
sometimes optimal to keep inﬂation above the level prescribed by the Friedman rule .4 Also,
we illustrate how the presence of nominal frictions enhances the welfare gains associated with
the optimal deﬂation and eliminates a real indeterminacy at the Friedman rule.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the environment. Section 3 solves a
model in which there is no money but prices are posted in terms of a unit of account. Section
4 investigates a monetary model with ﬂexible prices, and then with sticky prices. All proofs of
lemmas and propositions are relegated to the appendix.
Golosov and Lucas (2003).
4These results are not inconsistent with ﬁndings in new Keynesian models based on monopolistic competition
and time-dependent pricing. In those models, the Friedman rule is optimal if prices are ﬂexible despite the
presence of imperfect competition. With sticky prices, deﬂation is still optimal but the deﬂation rate can be
lower than the one at the Friedman rule. For details and references, see Khan, King, and Wolman (2002).
32 The environment
Time is continuous and goes on forever. Some trades take place in a centralized market, and
others in a decentralized market with bilateral random matching. There are two types of
perishable goods, a special good, produced in diﬀerent varieties, and a general good.W h e r e a s
the general good is produced and traded in the centralized market, special goods are traded in
the decentralized market.5
The economy is populated with a continuum of inﬁnitely-lived agents divided into two cat-
egories, called buyers and sellers to reﬂect their trading behaviors in the decentralized market.
The measure of buyers is normalized to one. The measure of sellers, denoted n,w i l lb ee n -
dogenous. Buyers diﬀer from sellers both in the goods they produce and in their consumption
preferences. Whereas both types of agents consume and produce the general good, buyers,








Special goods consume produce
Agents’ trading behaviors
The utility of consuming q units of special goods is u0q with u0 > 0.6 The disutility of
producing special goods is c(q) with c(0) = c0(0) = 0, c0(q) > 0 and c00(q) > 0 for q>0,
and c(q)=u0q for some q>0. The instantaneous utility function of buyers and sellers in
the centralized market is simply x,w h e r ex is the net consumption ﬂow of general goods.7
Given this speciﬁcation, producing the general good for oneself is worthless. Buyers and sellers
5The assumption that trades take place in both centralized and decentralized markets was introduced by
Lagos and Wright (2005). The environment described in this paper is closer to Rocheteau and Wright (2005).
6The linearity of the utility function in terms of special goods, also used by Benabou (1988), will simplify
greatly sellers’ pricing strategy.
7The linear speciﬁcation for the utility functions for centralized market goods is a key assumption to obtain
a tractable model in which the distribution of money holdings is easy to handle. See Lagos and Wright (2005).
4discount future utility at the same rate, ρ>0.
Unmatched agents trade in the centralized market. They are thrown into a bilateral match,
i.e., in the decentralized market, according to a stochastic Poisson process. When matched,
agents do not have access to the centralized market.8 Matched agents choose whether or not to
trade, split apart immediately after the trade has occurred, and return to the centralized market.
Since an agent does not have the ability to produce general goods while in the decentralized
market, he can only transfer the special good he produces or the assets he holds at the time he
is matched.9
Regarding agents’ abilities to use credit, we will consider two polar cases. We will ﬁrst
consider an economy in which buyers are able to commit to repay their debts and therefore can
use IOUs to trade in the decentralized market. We will call this economy a cashless economy.10
We will then consider a monetary economy where buyers are unable to commit to repay their
debt and need to use money in order to trade in the decentralized market.
The trading opportunities in the decentralized market are described by a standard random-
matching technology. The instantaneous matching probability of a buyer is α(n),w h e r e a st h e
instantaneous matching probability of a seller is α(n)/n.F u r t h e r m o r e , α0 > 0 and α00 < 0,
α(0) = 0, α0(0) = ∞, α0(∞)=0and limn→∞ α(n)=∞.W ed e n o t eη(n)=α0(n)n/α(n) the
elasticity of the matching function. As we also want to endogenize n,w ea s s u m et h a ts e l l e r s
who participate in the decentralized market incur a ﬂow cost, k>0, to search for buyers and
to advertise their products.11
There exists a good called money that is intrinsically useless but that serves as a unit of
account. The monetary price of the general good is w(t). It will be exogenous in the cashless
economy, and will be determined by a market-clearing condition in the monetary economy. In
8For a somewhat related formalization where centralized and decentralized markets open concurrently, see
Williamson (2004).
9One could assume instead that even though general goods can be produced in bilateral matches, the seller
does not wish to consume the general good produced by the buyer in the match.
10Related cashless economies with state-dependent pricing are studied in Caplin and Spulber (1987), Benabou
(1988, 1992), Diamond (1993), Golosov and Lucas (2003), among others.
11The assumption of free-entry is standard in the search literature to endogenize the number of trades. See,
among others, Pissarides (2000), Diamond (1993) and Rocheteau and Wright (2005).
5the decentralized market, we adopt the following pricing protocol. Unmatched sellers post a
monetary price. They can change their posted prices at any time at the cost γ in terms of utility.
When a match occurs, the transaction price is chosen as follows. With probability 1−θ,e v e r y
unit that is produced is sold at the seller’s posted price. The quantity traded is the minimum of
the buyer’s demand and the seller’s supply at this price. With probability θ ∈ (0,1),h o w e v e r ,
the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer. If this oﬀer is rejected by the seller, no trade takes
place. One can think of this as price posting with imperfect commitment.12 While this pricing
procedure is very stylized, it is realistic in that transaction prices often diﬀer from posted prices.
There are two additional reasons to give buyers some market power by allowing them to make
oﬀers in some matches. First, without this assumption there would be no monetary equilibrium
in the economy with ﬂexible prices.13 Second, this assumption will allow us to derive a simple
condition on θ and η(n) under which a deviation from price stability is optimal in the cashless
economy.
3C a s h l e s s e c o n o m i e s
In this section, we describe an economy in which there are no monetary frictions and agents do
not hold nominal assets; they use credit arrangements to trade in the decentralized market.14
Buyers commit to repay their debt in the general goods market straight after a trade has
occurred. Sellers post a monetary price at which they commit to sell their output. The monetary
price of general goods, w(t), is exogenous and is growing at rate π ≥− ρ. In the following, we
will refer to the real price p as the nominal price posted by sellers divided by the price of general
12For instance, a seller instructs a sales clerk to sell his output at the posted price. The commitment technology
is imperfect in the sense that the sales clerk is not always in the shop, let’s say, because it is too costly to have an
employee full time. This is related to the assumption of costly price commitment introduced by Bester (1994).
One can also view this pricing mechanism as a bargaining game with nominal rigidities.
13In order to allow for the existence of a monetary equilibrium in an economy with price posting, one can
introduce heterogeneity across buyers. See Curtis and Wright (2004) and Ennis (2004).
14Our model is related to the one in Diamond (1993) but it diﬀers from it in several dimensions. First, buyers
can appropriate the surplus of a match in a fraction θ of the meetings, whereas in Diamond’s model, θ is assumed
to be 0. Second, the quantity traded in each match is endogenous, whereas in Diamond, it is set exogenously
at 1. Third, buyers can trade repeatedly in the search market whereas buyers only trade once in Diamond’s
environment. As we will show, none of these assumptions is crucial to Diamond’s results.
6goods, w.N o t et h a tp decreases at rate π as long as the monetary price remains unchanged.
Consider a buyer. The Poisson arrival rate of a match in the decentralized market is α(n).
With probability θ, the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer (qb,d b),w h e r eqb is the quantity
of special goods produced by the seller, and db is the quantity of general goods that the buyer
commits to deliver (the subscript b reﬂects the assumption that the oﬀer is made by a buyer).
With probability 1 − θ, the buyer trades at the posted price: He consumes qs in exchange for
ds = pqs units of general goods. The quantity qs, which is the minimum of the buyer’s demand
and the seller’s supply at the posted price, is a function of p. The value function of a buyer,
Wb,s a t i s ﬁes the following ﬂow Bellman equation
ρWb = α(n)
½







where H(p) is the distribution of real prices across sellers.
Consider next a seller. As shown by Sheshinsky and Weiss (1977), in the presence of menu
costs sellers change their price according to an (s,S) rule. If π>0, the real price of the
seller falls until it reaches the trigger point s and is then readjusted to the target point S.
Conversely, if π<0 the real price increases steadily from s to S. The length of the period of
time between two price adjustments is denoted τ. Suppose the seller has not adjusted his price
for a period of time of length h ∈ (0,τ). His posted price expressed in terms of the general
good is p(h)=Se−πh if π>0,a n dp(h)=se−πh if π<0. The seller’s expected utility, Ws(h),








where G(p), the seller’s expected trade surplus, satisﬁes
G(p)=( 1− θ){qs(p)p − c[qs(p)]} + θ{db − c(qb)}. (3)
Equation (2) has the following interpretation. The seller incurs the cost k to participate in
the market. A match occurs with instantaneous probability α(n)/n, in which case the seller’s
expected surplus is G(p). The last term on the right-hand side of (2) reﬂects the fact that the
seller’s value function is not constant over the (S,s) cycle.
7At the end of the (S,s) cycle, i.e., when h = τ, the seller readjusts his price and starts a new
cycle so that Ws(τ)=Ws(0)−γ. Furthermore, the free entry of sellers implies Ws(0)−γ =0 ,
and Ws(τ)=0 . This simply means that a seller who readjusts his price is in the same position























dt = γ. (5)
According to (5), the expected discounted utility of a seller over the (S,s) cycle has to be equal
to the cost of setting a new price.
3.1 Equilibrium
To characterize equilibrium, we need to specify how terms of trade are formed in the decen-
tralized market. Consider a match between a buyer and a seller whose posted price is p.A s
previously stated, the transaction price diﬀers from the posted price with probability θ.I n
this case, the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer (qb,d b) in order to maximize his utility
u(qb)−db, subject to the sellers’ participation constraint, −c(qb)+db ≥ 0. The solution is then
qb = q∗ and db = c(q∗),w h e r eq∗ solves u0 = c0(q∗).
With probability 1−θ, agents trade at the posted price. However, the seller can choose not
to serve all the buyer’s demand at that price. The buyer’s demand corresponds to the value of
q that maximizes his surplus u0q − pq. It is unbounded if u0 >pand it is 0 if u0 <p .15 We
call u0 the buyer’s reservation price. Also, sellers produce no more than the quantity q that
maximizes qp− c(q). Therefore, qs(p) is given by
qs(p)=
½
c0−1(p) if p ≤ u0
0 otherwise
. (6)
15In the knife-edge case, where u
0 = p, the buyer is indiﬀerent between trading or not. To guarantee that the
seller’s pricing problem has a solution, we assume that the buyer’s demand is at least equal to the quantity q
∗
that the seller is willing to produce at this price.
8The optimal pricing policy of sellers is such that S and τ maximize sellers’ expected utility
as given by the left-hand side of (5). It is characterized in the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 (i) If γ =0then sellers set a real price equal to u0. (ii) Assume γ>0. The sellers’




n(ργ + k), if π<0
, (7)
and τ = ∞ if π =0 .
For all inﬂation rates, sellers target the buyers’ reservation price u0. They do not let their
price go beyond this target. This result is intuitive since a seller’s expected sales fall to 0 if
his price is above u0. In the presence of inﬂation, the opportunity cost of delaying the price
adjustment is ρWs(τ)=0(in ﬂow terms), whereas the instantaneous beneﬁti s
α(n)
n G[p(τ)] −
k. Therefore, the seller adjusts his price when his instantaneous utility falls to 0.16 In the
case of deﬂation, the seller readjusts his price when it reaches the buyer’s reservation price,
u0, irrespective of his choice for s. The opportunity cost for the seller of delaying the price
adjustment by setting a price smaller than s is equal to ρWs(0) = ργ. From (7) there is a
symmetry between inﬂation and deﬂa t i o no n l yw h e nρ → 0.
All through the paper, we focus on time-invariant cross-sectional distributions of real prices
by assuming that real prices are log-uniformly distributed over [s,S]. As shown by Caplin and
Spulberg (1987) and Benabou (1988), the log-uniform distribution is the only one that is time
invariant and consistent with the (s,S) rule.17 Equivalently, the length of the period of time
during which a seller’s price has been kept unchanged is uniformly distributed on [0,τ].
Deﬁnition 1 An equilibrium is a pair (n,τ) that satisﬁe s( 5 )a n d( 7 )i fπ 6=0or (5) and
τ = ∞ if π =0 .
16O n em a yw o n d e rw h yt h em e n uc o s tγ does not appear in Equation (7) when π>0. The reason is that the
continuation value of a seller who readjusts his price is −γ + W
s(0). From the free-entry condition, this term is
0. Note, however, that the menu cost γ appears in the free-entry condition.
17Under a steady inﬂation, a log-uniform distribution of prices is equivalent to a uniform staggered timing
(Rotemberg, 1983).
9We illustrate the determination of equilibrium in Figure 1. The free-entry curve corresponds
to (5), whereas the pricing curve corresponds to (7). The pricing-curve slopes downward since
sellers need to readjust their prices more frequently when the market is congested. The pricing-
curve intersects the free-entry-curve when the latter reaches a maximum: The number of sellers
is highest when the frequency of price adjustment is chosen optimally. As π increases, the free-
entry-curve shifts downward (see dotted curve), n decreases, and πτ increases. Inﬂation drives





Proposition 1 If θ<1, equilibrium exists and is unique. If γ =0 , n is independent of π.I f
γ>0, ∂πτ/∂π > 0,a n d∂n/∂π < 0.

















This welfare measure is legitimate since the free-entry condition drives sellers’ expected utility
to 0. Denote n0 the measure of sellers when π =0 .
18For a search-theoretic model with endogenous price dispersion and ﬂexible prices, see Head and Kumar
(2003) and Head, Kumar and Lapham (2004).
10Proposition 2 If γ =0 , equilibrium is eﬃcient iﬀ 1 − θ = η(n0).
The condition in Proposition 2 is similar to the one derived by Hosios (1990) for an eﬃcient
allocation in the presence of congestion externalities. It states that the measure of sellers is
socially eﬃcient if the fraction of the matches where sellers appropriate the whole surplus of a
match coincides with sellers’ contribution to the matching process as measured by the elasticity
of the matching function. If 1 − θ>α 0(n)n/α(n), n is too high. Although it may not be well
known, this is the main ineﬃciency in the Diamond (1993) economy.
























> 0 iﬀ θ<[1 − η(n0)]/[1 + η(n0)].
Proposition 3 indicates under which circumstances price dispersion is desirable taking into
account the eﬀect of price dispersion on the number of sellers. Price dispersion has two opposite
eﬀects on buyers’ welfare. It raises the ability of buyers to extract a higher surplus, but it also
reduces the number of sellers and therefore the frequency of trades. If θ is low, the ﬁrst eﬀect
dominates and price dispersion raises buyers’ welfare. In Diamond’s (1993) economy, θ =0so
the condition in Proposition 3 is satisﬁed. As a corollary, Proposition 3 indicates under which
circumstances a deviation from price stability is optimal since we know from Proposition 1 that
∂ |πτ|/∂ |π| > 0.A s s u m i n gγ is close to 0 so that limπ↓0 πτ ' 0, then a deviation from price
stability is optimal if θ<[1 − η(n0)]/[1 + η(n0)]. However, we cannot infer from Proposition
3 whether it is better to generate price dispersion through inﬂation or deﬂation.
Proposition 4 Assume γ is positive but close to 0. The optimal inﬂation rate is non-negative.
11The intuition for this result goes as follows.19 If buyers could choose the inﬂation rate, they
would face a trade-oﬀ between the larger share in the gains from trade that is associated with
higher price dispersion and the lower frequency of trade that is associated with the smaller
number of sellers in the market. For a given price dispersion |πτ|,i n ﬂation hurts sellers less
than deﬂation does. Indeed, if π>0, sellers set their prices to S and get high proﬁts at the
beginning of the cycle, whereas if π<0, they set their prices to s and get low proﬁts ﬁrst.
Therefore, it is optimal to reduce sellers’ market power by running a positive inﬂation instead
of a deﬂation.
3.2 Numerical examples
We illustrate Propositions 3 and 4 through numerical examples. A unit of time corresponds to
a year, and agents’ rate of time preference is 3%. As a normalization, we take u0 =1 .T h e
production cost in the decentralized market is c(q)=qδ/δ,w i t hδ =1 .5, and thus q∗ =1 .T h e
matching function is α(n)=nη,w i t hη =0 .5, so that buyers and sellers contribute equally to
the formation of matches. Sellers’ participation cost is k =0 .1, which is 20% of the total value
of a match, and the cost to adjust prices is γ =0 .001, which is 1% of the sellers’ participation
cost.20 We take as our benchmark θ =0 .32.
19This result explains the numerical example provided by Diamond and Felli (1992).
20Given our choice for γ, prices are adjusted every 6 months when the inﬂation rate is about 2%, which
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∆ (%) as a function of π.
Our numerical examples show that inﬂation and deﬂation have almost symmetric eﬀects
on n and τ. A deviation from price stability reduces the number of sellers and raises price
dispersion (See Proposition 1). We use Wb as a measure of welfare, and we determine the
welfare cost of inﬂation, ∆, as the fraction of total consumption that buyers would be willing
to sacriﬁce to be in an economy with price stability. Consider an economy with π =0 ,w h e r e








13where n0 is the measure of sellers in equilibrium. Let Wb
π be buyers’ welfare in an economy
with π inﬂation. The cost of inﬂa t i o ni sm e a s u r e db yt h e∆ that solves Wb
π = Wb
0(∆).F o r
θ =0 .32 and π>0, the welfare cost of inﬂation, ∆, is a U-shaped function of π.A ss h o w ni n
Proposition 4, the optimal inﬂation rate is positive. Finally, we plot the welfare cost of inﬂation
for θ =0 .3 and θ =0 .36. In accordance with Proposition 3, in this economy inﬂation raises
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∆ as a function of π (%).
144 Monetary economies
We now introduce a transaction role for money by assuming that buyers cannot commit to
repay their debts. In the absence of credit arrangements, trades in bilateral matches need to
be quid pro quo, and this requires buyers hold money balances. The price of general goods
in terms of money is now endogenous. We will determine the optimal monetary policy in the
absence of menu costs, and we will investigate how the presence of nominal frictions aﬀects
policy.
The quantity of ﬁat money per buyer is M(t) > 0. The growth rate of the money supply
is constant over time and equal to π ≥− ρ;t h a ti s , ˙ M = πM. Money is injected (withdrawn
if π<0) by lump-sum transfers (taxes). For simplicity, transfers go only to buyers. We
will restrict our attention to steady-state equilibria in which the real value of money M/w is
constant over time, i.e., ˙ w = πw.
Let Wb(z) be the value of an unmatched buyer holding z units of real money (expressed
in terms of the general good). The stochastic time for a buyer to ﬁnd a seller, denoted Tb,i s
characterized by an exponential distribution with mean 1/α. The value function Wb(z) satisﬁes





e−ρtx(t)dt + e−ρTbV b [z(Tb)]
¸
(9)
s.t. x + ˙ z = L − πz, (10)
z(0) = z0, (11)
where x(t) is the net consumption ﬂow of general goods at time t,w h e r eV b(z) is the value
function of a matched buyer holding z units of real money, and where the trajectory {x(t),z(t)}
is contingent on t<T b.21 The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of (9) is the utility of consump-
tion minus the disutility of production over the time interval [0,T b]. The second term is the
present value of being matched at time Tb with z(Tb) units of real money. Equation (10) is a
budget identity. The term L on the right-hand side is a lump-sum transfer expressed in terms
21Implicitly, we allow for jumps in the state variables. For a presentation of optimal control problems with
jumps in state variables, see Seierstad and Sydsaeter (1987, chapter 3).
15o ft h eg e n e r a lg o o d ,a n dt h el a s tt e r mr e ﬂects the fact that real balances depreciate at rate π.22
The initial condition for real balances is given by (11).
From the assumption that Tb is exponentially distributed, (9) can be rewritten









subject to (10) and (11).23 Interestingly, (12) is analogous to a deterministic optimal control
problem in which the eﬀective discount rate is ρ + α(n) and the instantaneous utility is x +
α(n)V b (z).







The left-hand side of (13) is the beneﬁt for the buyer of an additional unit of real balances,
whereas the right-hand side is the marginal cost of real balances. This cost, measured in terms
of the general good, is the sum of the forgone unit of the general good and the cost of holding
real balances, as measured by the sum of the discount rate and the inﬂation rate, over a period
of time of length 1/α(n). Assuming V b(z) is strictly concave (it will be), the solution to (13) is
unique and the steady-state distribution of real balances across buyers is degenerate at z =ˆ z.
Given that the buyer adjusts his real balances to ˆ z instantly, we have Wb(z)=−(ˆ z−z)+Wb(ˆ z),
and in particular, Wb(z)=z + Wb(0).
The value function of a matched buyer satisﬁes
V b(z)=θ
n




u0qs(z,p)+Wb [z − pqs(z,p)]
o
dH(p), (14)
where qs depends on both the buyer’s real balances and the real price p posted by the seller.
With probability θ, the buyer has the ability to make an oﬀer (qb,d b). He enjoys the utility of
22Let m be the buyer’s nominal balances. Then, z = m/w and ˙ z = −( ˙ w/w)(m/w)+ ˙ m/w. To obtain (10),
use the fact that ˙ w/w = π and ˙ m/w = −x + L.
23See the Appendix for a derivation of (12).
16consumption u0qb and becomes unmatched with z −db units of real balances. With probability
1−θ, the buyer trades at the posted price p and consumes qs u n i t so fg o o d sf o rpqs units of real









qs(z,p)dH(p)+z + Wb(0). (15)
The seller’s value function obeys the Bellman equation (2), where G is now a function of
F(z), the distribution of real balances across buyers,
G(p)=
Z
(1 − θ){qs(z,p)p − c[qs(z,p)]} + θ{db(z) − c[qb(z)]}dF(z). (16)
Let us turn to the determination of prices. In the fraction θ of the matches where the buyer






s.t. − c(qb)+db =0 and db ≤ z. (17)
The main diﬀerence with respect to the previous section is that the transfer db is constrained
by the buyer’s (monetary) wealth. The solution to (17) is
qb =
½
q∗ if z ≥ z∗ ≡ c(q∗)
c−1(z) otherwise
.( 1 8 )
According to (18), if z>z ∗,t h e ndb ≤ z is not binding and agents trade the eﬃcient quantity
q∗.I fz<z ∗, then the constraint binds and the buyer spends all his real balances to buy less
than q∗. In the fraction 1−θ of the matches where agents trade at the posted price, the buyer













The case where prices can be adjusted at no cost (γ =0 ) will allow us to contrast the monetary
economy with the economy described in the previous section.24 In particular, we will show that
even though inﬂation drives sellers out of the market in both versions of the model, this eﬀect
is not welfare-enhancing in the monetary economy, as long as prices are ﬂexible.
When prices can be adjusted at no cost, the sellers’ optimal pricing strategy is p = u0 for
any distribution of real balances F(z). The reasoning is similar to the one in Lemma 1. If
buyers choose p>u 0, they make no trade, and sellers have no incentive to choose a price lower
than u0 since for all p ≤ u0 buyers spend all their real balances. This pricing strategy allows
sellers to extract all the surplus of a match whenever agents trade at the posted price. From





+ z + Wb(0).









+1 if z<z ∗,
1 otherwise.
(20)
Equation (20) can be interpreted as follows. Consider a match where the buyer makes a take-
it-or-leave-it oﬀer. If the buyer brings one additional unit of real balances, he increases his
consumption by 1/c0(qb),w h i c hi sw o r t hu0/c0(qb) in terms of utility. Consider next a match
where the buyer trades at the posted price. The buyer can increase his consumption by 1/u0,
which is worth 1 in terms of utility. From (20), V b
zz < 0 for all z<z ∗.F r o m L e m m a 2 ,
there is a unique solution ˆ z<z ∗ to (13), and the distribution of real balances across buyers is







24This model is related to the search equilibrium described in Rocheteau and Wright (2005).
25To check that z<z
∗,n o t eﬁrst that V
b
z (z) is strictly decreasing for all z<z
∗.F u r t h e r m o r e ,ρ+α(n)+π>
α(n)V
b
z (z) for all z ≥ z
∗ and for all π>−ρ.










Deﬁnition 2 A monetary equilibrium with ﬂexible prices is a list (z,n) that satisﬁes (21) and
(22).
Assume π>−ρ (We will treat the case π = −ρ separately). We cannot rule out multiplicity
of steady-state equilibria. When such multiplicity arises, we focus on the equilibrium with the
highest values for q and n as it converges to an equilibrium at the Friedman rule.
Proposition 5 If θ =0or θ =1 , there is no monetary equilibrium. If θ ∈ (0,1),t h e r ee x i s t s
¯ π>−ρ such that a monetary equilibrium exists for all π ∈ (−ρ, ¯ π). At the equilibrium with the
highest z, ∂z/∂π < 0 and ∂n/∂π < 0.
If θ =0 , there is no demand for real balances and hence no monetary equilibrium. Similarly,
if θ =1 , there is no active equilibrium because sellers have no incentive to enter the market. So,
for a monetary equilibrium, we need θ ∈ (0,1). In contrast to the model in the previous section,
inﬂation is no longer neutral when γ =0 .A n i n c r e a s e i n π reduces the quantities traded in
bilateral matches as well as the measure of sellers in the market. Therefore, one may conjecture
that the result for cahsless economies, that inﬂation is welfare improving when n is too high,
carries over to monetary economies. The following proposition shows that this conjecture is
wrong.
Proposition 6 Welfare is decreasing with π, and the optimal monetary policy is the Friedman
rule. Furthermore, limπ↓−ρ qb = q∗ and limπ↓−ρ qs <q ∗.
According to Proposition 6, the monetary equilibrium is ineﬃcient since the quantities
traded in matches where agents trade at the posted price are always ineﬃciently low, even
at the limit when π approaches −ρ. This monopolistic competition ineﬃciency is related to
the fact that sellers do not internalize the eﬀects of their pricing decisions on buyers’ real
19balances.26 Even if the quantities traded in bilateral matches were eﬃcient, the entry of sellers
would generically be ineﬃcient because of the presence of search externalities.
Let us turn to the case π = −ρ.D e n o t en∗ the value of n that satisﬁes (22) when qs = q∗.
Proposition 7 If π = −ρ then any (z,n) such that z ∈ [c(q∗),u 0q∗] and n satisﬁes (22) is
an equilibrium. Equilibria are strictly positively Pareto-ranked according to z. There is an
equilibrium that generates the ﬁrst-best allocation iﬀ θ =1− η(n∗).
From the previous proposition, there is a real indeterminacy at the Friedman rule. There
exists a continuum of equilibria and these equilibria are Pareto-ranked. Intuitively, when π+ρ =
0 there is no cost of holding real balances so that buyers are indiﬀerent between any level of
real balances above c(q∗). However, an increase in real balances above c(q∗) allows sellers to
extract a higher surplus in matches where buyers trade at the posted price. If one selects the
equilibrium by taking the limit π →− ρ, this equilibrium corresponds to the one with the lowest
welfare, i.e., the one with the lowest real balances.
4.2 Sticky prices
Assume now that sellers must incur a ﬁxed cost to change prices. As in the previous section, we
focus on steady-state equilibria in which the distribution of (real) prices, H(p), is time-invariant
and price adjustments are uniformly staggered. The seller’s value function obeys a ﬂow Bellman
equation analogous to condition (2), but where G is given by (16). The pricing policy of sellers
is still given by Lemma 1.
We describe the buyer’s choice of real balan c e si nt h ec a s ew h e r et h eg r o w t hr a t eo ft h e
money supply is positive (π>0). If a buyer meets a seller at random, the price posted by the
seller is p(h)=u0e−πh,w h e r eh is uniformly distributed over [0,τ].T h eq u a n t i t yqs satisﬁes
qs(z,u0e−πh)=
½




26This ineﬃciency should be distinguished from the bargaining ineﬃciency based on the nonmonotonicity of
the generalized Nash solution in Lagos and Wright (2005).




. The seller serves
all the buyer’s demand if p(h) ≥ p(˜ h) ; otherwise, the buyer is rationed. From (15) and (19),






















dh + z + Wb(0). (23)
Let us interpret the second term on the right-hand side of (23). If h<˜ h, the seller satisﬁes all










Therefore, the buyer can extract a positive surplus even when trading at the posted price. The
third term on the right-hand side has a similar interpretation.















dh +1 , (24)
where [x]
+ =m a x ( x,0). If the buyer can make a take-it-or-leave-it-oﬀer, one additional unit of
real balances allows him to raise his utility by u0
c0[qb(z)]. If the buyer trades at the posted price,
p(h)=u0e−πh, and assuming that the seller satisﬁes all his demand, an additional unit of real
balances allows him to buy eπh/u0 units of special goods which is worth eπh in terms of utility.
From (24), V b(z) is concave, and strictly concave for all z<z ∗ and for all z such that

















Inﬂation has two opposite eﬀects on the value of money. It raises the opportunity cost of holding
cash, the left-hand side of (25), and it transfers some market power to the buyer, the second
term on right-hand side of (25). The second eﬀect is absent from the model with ﬂexible prices.
27To obtain (23), we use the fact that for all h<˜ h, (u
0 − pφ)qs = ze
πh−z,w h e r e a sf o ra l lh>˜ h, (u



























where ˜ h(z) satisﬁes ze−π˜ h = u0c0−1(u0eπ˜ h).
Deﬁnition 3 A steady-state monetary equilibrium with menu cost is a list (z,n,τ) that satisﬁes
(5), (7) and, if π>0,( 2 5 ) ,o ri fπ<0, (26).
At the Friedman rule, ρ + π =0and, from (26), qb = q∗,a n d˜ h(z)=0 . Therefore, the
quantities produced and consumed in matches where agents trade at the posted price obey
c0(qs)=u0e−|π|h for all h ∈ [0,τ]. In particular, z = u0q∗ and qs(0) = q∗. The economy is then
analogous to the cashless economy studied in the previous section.
4.3 Numerical examples
The model with endogenous real balances and state-dependent pricing is hard to study analyti-
cally. Therefore, we conduct our analysis through numerical examples. While we report results
for only one set of parameter values, the one used in the previous section, our reported results
are fairly typical of all the examples we have considered. The panels on the left (right) plot
the endogenous variables for negative (positive) inﬂation rates. The lines labelled “Flexible”
indicate the values for z and n in the absence of menu costs.
In presence of menu costs and positive inﬂation (right panel), z is a hump-shaped function
of π. As outlined in (25), inﬂation raises the cost of holding real balances, but it also allows
buyers to extract a larger share of the gains from trade. For very low but positive inﬂation
rates, the second eﬀect dominates, whereas above a certain threshold, the ﬁrst eﬀect takes over.
Note also that real balances are higher in the presence of menu costs since the second eﬀect
of inﬂation is absent from the model with ﬂexible prices. Consider next the case of negative
money growth rates (left panel). An increase in the deﬂation rate reduces the cost of holding
real balances and it raises buyers’ average share in the gains from trade. As a consequence,
z increases. The relationship between z and π exhibits an inﬂection point when z is in the
22neighborhood of z∗ =2 /3. The intuition for this is as follows. At z = z∗, τ<˜ h so that buyers
are never rationed. When the inﬂation rate falls below the value that generates z∗, buyers
increase their real balances until they get rationed in some matches: z increases to the value
that satisﬁes ˜ h(z)=τ. It is also interesting to notice that the presence of nominal frictions
eliminates the real indeterminacy of the ﬂexible price economy at the Friedman rule. As π
tends to −ρ, z approaches u0q∗, the level of real balances that maximizes the seller’s surplus in
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z as a function of π (%).
Let us turn to the eﬀects of positive inﬂation on the number of sellers. On the one hand,
inﬂation reduces sellers’ incentives to enter the market since they have to readjust prices more
frequently. On the other hand, for low inﬂation rates, sellers beneﬁt from meeting buyers with
higher real balances. For our parameter values, the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates and n decreases with
π.D e ﬂation has two eﬀects on the measure of sellers. Since buyers carry more real balances,
sellers have higher incentives to enter the market. But deﬂation also implies that sellers need to
readjust their prices more often. For low deﬂation rates, the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates while when
π gets closer to the Friedman rule, the second eﬀect dominates. The inﬂection point for real
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The eﬀects of inﬂation on the length of the (S,s) cycle and price dispersion are in accordance
with those obtained in cashless economies. As inﬂation increases, sellers need to readjust their
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For positive money growth rates, the welfare cost of inﬂation is a U-shaped function of π.
A small increase in inﬂation above price stability is welfare-improving because inﬂation raises
buyers’ gains from trade and therefore their incentives to invest in real balances. Note however
that the welfare gains of positive inﬂation are tiny, less than 0.1% of consumption. A stronger
eﬀect occurs when one reduces π below 0 since lowering the inﬂation rate reduces the cost of
holding real balances. In particular, the sharp increase of real balances in the neighborhood of
z = z∗ has a large positive eﬀect on welfare. For our example, the welfare gain of reducing π
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To summarize, the presence of nominal rigidities can explain why a small positive inﬂation
can generate a higher welfare than price stability. Assuming prices are sticky, as inﬂation
increases buyers are able to extract larger gains from trades. As a consequence, they have
incentives to increase their real balances which aﬀects welfare positively. However, when looking
at the optimal monetary policy, deﬂation does better than inﬂation. This contrasts with our
result for cashless economies. The reason for this diﬀerence is that our model incorporates a
monetary wedge. In the presence of sticky prices, deﬂation reduces sellers’ market power, just
as inﬂation does. In addition, deﬂation reduces the cost of holding real balances.
4.4 The Friedman rule
We have seen that in presence of nominal rigidities and a monetary wedge, the optimal inﬂation
rate is negative. However, it is not clear from the previous Figures whether the Friedman rule
is optimal or not. Close to the Friedman rule, the economy behaves similarly to the cashless
economy. In particular, the number of sellers decreases as π decreases (equivalently, the deﬂation
rate decreases). If the number of sellers is ineﬃciently high at the Friedman rule, the Friedman
rule is optimal since an increase of the inﬂation rate makes the number of sellers even higher.
The case where there are too many sellers because of congestion externalities corresponds to
26low values of θ. In the example below, the Friedman rule is optimal for θ =0 .25. In contrast,
if the number of sellers is too low at the Friedman rule, a deviation from the Friedman rule
can be optimal because an increase in inﬂation raises the entry of sellers. The case where there
are too few sellers corresponds to large values of θ. In the example below, the Friedman rule
is not optimal for θ =0 .45. We found that the threshold for θ a b o v ew h i c ht h eF r i e d m a nr u l e
is no longer optimal is slighty above 1/3,t h et h r e s h o l df o rθ above which a deviation from
price stability is suboptimal in cashless economies. So the extent of search externalities matters
in cashless economies to explain the optimality of price stability while it matters in monetary
economies to explain the optimality of the Friedman rule.
45 . 0 = θ
45 . 0 = θ
25 . 0 = θ
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5C o n c l u s i o n
We considered a model of monetary policy that incorporates realistic frictions in the trading
process and price formation. We studied ﬁrst a version of the model in which there is no
transaction demand for money. We established a simple condition under which deviations from
price stability could raise welfare. In the presence of menu costs, inﬂation reduces sellers’ market
power, which is beneﬁcial to society when there are congestion eﬀects in the goods market. We
27have also shown that inﬂationary policies dominate deﬂationary ones. So this model provides
some rationale for why positive inﬂation should be preferred to price stability.
We then extended the model to allow for monetary exchange. When prices are ﬂexible, the
optimal monetary policy is given by the Friedman rule, but equilibrium is still ineﬃcient. In the
presence of menu costs, and for non-negative inﬂation rates, welfare is a hump-shaped function
of the inﬂation rate. Again, inﬂation erodes sellers’ market power, which has a positive eﬀect
on individual real balances, and in some cases, inﬂation also ameliorates congestion. However,
deﬂa t i o ni sb e t t e rt h a ni n ﬂation since it also reduces the cost of holding real balances. The
optimal monetary policy may or may not correspond to the Friedman rule depending on the
extent of search externalities. The results are summarized in the following table.
Flexible prices Sticky prices
No monetary wedge π is neutral
π∗ =0if θ high
π∗ > 0 if θ low
Monetary wedge π∗ = −ρ
π∗ > −ρ if θ high
π∗ = −ρ if θ low
Summary of the results
On a methodological note, we have shown how models of monetary exchange can be ex-
tended to incorporate the sticky prices that some economists think matter for monetary policy.
Introducing a cost to changing nominal prices provides a reason why deviations from the Fried-
man rule might be eﬃcient — something which is diﬃcult to achieve in the previous models
of monetary theory. Our analysis has also illustrated how the combined eﬀects of trading and
nominal frictions matter for the design of monetary policy.
28Appendix
A1. Derivation of (2)
The seller’s value function Ws(h) obeys the following Bellman equation:




e−ρt (−k)dt + e−ρTs [G[p(h + Ts)] + Ws(h + Ts)]





e−ρt (−k)dt + e−ρ(τ−h)Ws(τ)
¾
, (27)
where τ is the length of the period of time between two price adjustments, which has the
following interpretation. If Ts ≤ τ − h, then the seller meets a buyer before he readjusts his
price, and his expected surplus is G[p(h + Ts)],w h e r ep(h+Ts) is the price posted by the seller.
If Ts >τ− h, then no trade occurs before the seller’s real price hits the trigger point s.
The distribution for Ts conditional on Ts ≤ τ − h is a truncated exponential distribution.
Thus, Pr[Ts ≤ τ − h]=1− e−
α(n)






































































G[p(h)] + k + ρWs(h).
A2. Proof of Lemma 1.
We prove Lemma 1 for the case where buyers hold real balances z and cannot use credit.
The distribution of real balances across buyers is F(z).
Case 1: γ =0 .T h es e l l e rc h o o s e sp in order to maximize




[pq − c(q)]1{p≤u0}dF(z), (30)
where 1{p≤u0} is an indicator function that is equal to 1 if p ≤ u0 and 0 otherwise. According
to (30), in each match the seller chooses the quantity q to produce, subject to the constraint
that q is not greater than the buyer’s demand. If p>u 0 the buyer’s demand is 0,a n di fp ≤ u0
then the buyer’s demand is z/p.D e n o t eξ(z) the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to pq ≤ z.







[pq − c(q)]1{p≤u0} + ξ(z)[z − pq]
ª
dF(z). (31)
Assume p ≤ u0 so that 1{p≤u0} =1 .T h eﬁrst-order condition for q(z) is
p[1 − ξ(z)] = c0 [q(z)]. (32)





dF(z) > 0, ∀p ≤ u0.
Therefore, the optimal price is p = u0.
Case 2: γ>0 and π>0.F i r s t ,w es h o wS = u0 using a proof by contradiction. Assume
















30The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side corresponds to the interval of time during which the


















































Adopt the change of variable ˜ t = t −
ln(S/u0)












Consequently, a proﬁtable deviation is to set S = u0 while keeping s unchanged. Therefore,
S>u 0 is not optimal. Consider next a (S,s) rule such that S<u 0.S i n c eG(Se−πt) is increasing
in S, it can be checked from (4) that for given τ, Ws(0) is a strictly increasing function of S
for all S ≤ u0. Consequently, S<u 0 is not optimal. Second, to determine the optimal length
of the (S,s) cycle, diﬀerentiate the right-hand side of (4) with respect to τ to obtain (7).
Case 3: γ>0 and π<0. The reasoning for S = u0 is similar to the one for the case π>0.












Diﬀerentiate (34) with respect to τ and use the fact that Ws(0) = γ to obtain (7).
A3. Proof of Proposition 1
We consider three cases.





where G(u0)=( 1− θ)[u0q∗ − c(q∗)] > 0.S i n c e α(n)/n is continuous and strictly decreasing,
limn→0 α(n)/n = ∞ and limn→∞ α(n)/n =0 , there exists a unique n that satisﬁes (35) and it
is such that ∂n/∂π =0 .












dt = γ, (36)
where
G(p)=( 1− θ)max
q [pq − c(q)] if p ≤ u0
and G(p)=0otherwise. Let nf be the value of n that satisﬁes (35). The left-hand side of








that satisﬁes (36). Given n, price dispersion πτ is determined by (7). Totally














where η(n)=−α0(n)n/α(n).F r o m( 7 ) ,∂πτ/∂π > 0.















dt = γ. (37)




satisﬁes (37). Furthermore, ∂n/∂π > 0 and ∂ |π|τ/∂π<0.
A4. Proof of Proposition 2.
In the case γ =0 , W = Wb = α(n)[u(q) − c(q)] − kn.T h e e ﬃcient value for n satisﬁes
α0(n)[u0q∗ − c(q∗)] = k, whereas the equilibrium value for n satisﬁes α(n)(1−θ)[u0q∗ − c(q∗)] =
nk. The two coincide iﬀ α0(n)n/α(n)=1− θ.
32A5. Proof of Proposition 3
Consider the case γ>0 and π>0. The relationship between n and πτ is given by (7), i.e.,
α(n)(1 − θ)max
q
[u0e−πτq − c(q)] = nk. (38)





































It can be checked that dWb/dπτ > 0 iﬀ θ<[1 − η(n)]/[1 + η(n)]. The proof for the deﬂation
case is analogous to the one for the inﬂation case and is therefore omitted.
A6. Proof of Proposition 4
The proof is by contradiction. Assume the optimal inﬂation rate is π∗ < 0. From Proposition
1 there is a one-to-one relationship between πτ and π for all π>0, and there is a one-to-one
relationship between −πτ and π for all π<0. Furthermore, since γ ≈ 0, |π|τ approaches 0
as π tends to 0 . Let ˜ π be the positive inﬂation rate such that price dispersion |π|τ at π =˜ π
is equal to price dispersion at π = π∗. From (7) the measure of sellers satisﬁes n(˜ π) >n (π∗).
Therefore, from (8), Wb(˜ π) > Wb(π∗). A contradiction.
A7. Derivation of (12)




















V b [z(t)]α(n)e−[ρ+α(n)]tdt. (41)











α(n)V b [z(t)]e−[ρ+α(n)]tdt. (42)
Finally, substitute e−[α(n)]s for
R ∞
















A8. Proof of Lemma 2
Let λ be the current value costate variable associated with z. The current value Hamiltonian
is
H(x,z,λ)=x + α(n)V b (z)+λ(−x + L − πz). (43)
Assuming an interior solution for z, the necessary conditions from Pontryagin’s maximum
principle are




z (z) − λ
i
− πλ+ ˙ λ, (45)
where V b
z is the derivative of the value function V b(z). We add the following transversality




34To get (13), combine (44) and (45). Assuming V b (z) is concave, the Hamiltonian H(x,z,λ)
is jointly concave in (x,z). Since the transversality condition is satisﬁed for the solution given
by (44) and (45), it is a maximum. Furthermore, (10) implies ˙ λ =0and z satisﬁes (13). The
uniqueness of the solution to (13) follows from the strict concavity of V b (z). Note that the
state variable z jumps to the solution of (13) instantly.
A9. Proof of Proposition 5
Part 1. There is no monetary equilibrium if θ =0or θ =1 . From (21), if θ =0 ,t h e nq =0
or n = ∞. From (22), if n = ∞,t h e nq =0 . As a consequence, q =0 . From (22), if θ =1 ,
then n =0 , which from (21) implies q =0 .I nb o t hc a s e s ,m o n e yi sn o tv a l u e di ne x c h a n g e .
Part 2. If θ ∈ (0,1), there exists ¯ π>−ρ such that a monetary equilibrium exists for
all π<¯ π. At the equilibrium with the highest z, ∂z/∂π < 0 and ∂n/∂π < 0. Equilibrium
condition (21) can be reexpressed as
q = q(n;π) ≡ c0−1
∙
u0α(n)θ
ρ + π + α(n)θ
¸
, (47)
with q(0;π)=0and q(∞;π)=q∗.F u r t h e r m o r e ,q(n;π) is strictly increasing in n and strictly
decreasing in π. Using (47), equilibrium condition (22) can be reformulated as Γ(n;π)=0with










We ﬁrst show that under the Friedman rule (π = −ρ) a monetary equilibrium always exists.
From (47), q(n;−ρ)=q∗ for all n>0. Therefore, given that c(q∗) <u 0q∗, Γ(0;−ρ)=∞ and
Γ(∞;−ρ)=−k. Consequently, if π = −ρ there exists a n>0 that satisﬁes Γ(n;π)=0 .
Consider next π>−ρ. For all π>−ρ, Γ(∞;π)=−k. For all n>0, Γ(n;π) is continuous
and decreasing in π.U s i n gt h ec o n t i n u i t yo fΓ(n;π) one can deduce that there is a threshold
¯ π>−ρ such that for all π ∈ (−ρ, ¯ π) there exists n>0 such that Γ(n;π)=0 .
Finally, let us show that ∂z/∂π < 0 and ∂n/∂π < 0 at the equilibrium with the highest z.
Equations (21) and (22) give two positive relationships between z and n. Furthermore, at the
35equilibrium with the highest z the curve (21) cuts the curve (22) by below in the space (z,n).
An increase in π moves the curve (21) upward leading to a decrease of both z and n.
A 1 0 .P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6












From (22) and (49), social welfare in equilibrium reduces to W = α(n)θ[u0q − c(q)].G i v e n
that an increase in π reduces both q and n, the optimal monetary policy is the Friedman rule.
Let us turn to the second part of the proposition. Since z = c(qb) and c0(q∗)=p = u0,
qs =m i n[ q∗,c(qb)/u0].F r o m ( 1 8 ) ,f o r a l l z ≤ z∗, qb ≤ q∗ which implies c(qb) ≤ c(q∗) <u 0q∗.
Therefore, qs = c(qb)/u0 <q ∗.
A 1 1 .P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n7
From (18), qb(z)=q∗ for all z ∈ [c(q∗),u 0q∗]. Consequently, from (21), any z ∈ [c(q∗),u 0q∗]
corresponds to an equilibrium when π = −ρ. Seller’s welfare is 0 and buyer’s welfare is Wb =
α[n(z)]{u0q∗ − c(q∗)} where n(z) is the value of n that satisﬁes (22). Since n(z) is strictly
increasing in z, buyer’s welfare is strictly increasing in z so that equilibria with higher values
for z Pareto-dominate equilibria with lower values for z.T h eﬁrst-best allocation is such that
qb = qs = q∗ and n satisﬁes α0(n)[u0q∗ − c(q∗)] = k. From (18) and (19) this requires z = u0q∗,
and from (22),
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